Price collars have frequently been advocated to restrict the price of emissions permits. Consequently, collars were incorporated in the three bills languishing in Congress as well as in California's AB-32; Europeans are now considering price collars for EU ETS. In advocating collars, most analysts have assumed (1) collars will be implemented by government purchases and sales from bu¤erstocks, just like bands on foreign exchange rates or commodity prices; and (2) …rms must surrender permits whenever they pollute. In fact, however, no actual emissions trading scheme has conformed to these assumptions. In the current paper, we maintain the second assumption (continual compliance) and show that while a price collar supported by a su¢ ciently large bu¤erstock can restrict permit prices, a price collar supported instead by auctions with reserve prices cannot. In a companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant, 2012), we show that neither method works once account is taken of delayed compliance.
Introduction
Price ceilings, price ‡oors, or "price collars"(a combination of the two) have frequently been advocated to restrict the price of emissions permits. Collars were incorporated in the three bills languishing in Congress as well as in California's AB-32; Europeans are now considering price collars for EU ETS. 1 In advocating collars, virtually all analysts have assumed (1) collars will be implemented by government purchases and sales from bu¤erstocks, just like bands on foreign exchange rates or commodity prices; and (2) …rms must surrender permits continually as they pollute rather than after a delay.
There is an extensive literature that supports price collars or one-sided "safety valves" (either a price ceiling or a price ‡oor) on e¢ ciency grounds. Roberts and Spence (1976) demonstrated the expected welfare advantages of a price collar in a one-period model of competitive emissions trading when the regulator is uncertain about abatement costs. Since their model was static, the distinction between delayed and continual compliance did not arise; moreover, they proposed collars implemented by means of …nancial penalties and rewards rather than by bu¤erstock transactions or reserve price auctions. Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) summarize the origins of the safety-valve concept and suggest its possible application in future cap-and-trade programs to limit carbon emissions. Pizer (2002) …nds that introducing a one-sided safety valve into a pure quantity control mechanism leads to signi…cant welfare gains. More recently, Burtraw et al. (2010) and Fell and Morgenstern (2010) examine welfare consequences of introducing two-sided price collars. Burtraw et al. (2010) study a price collar for a cap-and-trade program by simulating a static model. They …nd that a price collar outperforms a one-sided "safety valve." Fell and Morgenstern (2010) simulate a stochastic dynamic model of a cap-and-trade program and compare several policies to reduce emissions: quantity policies with banking and borrowing, a price policy (an emissions tax), and hybrid policies (safety valve and price collar). However, both Burtraw et al. (2010) and Fell and Morgenstern (2010) assume that the price collar is implemented by a bu¤er-stock policy and that this price collar can always be maintained. They also assume that 1 For a recent discussion of this issue, see Robert Stavins's blogpost (www.robertstavinsblog.org) "Low Prices a Problem?" (April 25, 2012) . Stavins regards the absence of a safety valve or price collar in the European system as a "design ‡aw." For a discussion of how a price ‡oor could be introduced into the European system, see David Hone's blogpost (http://blogs.shell.com/climatechange/2012/06/auction/) "The Case for an Auction Reserve Price" (June 7, 2012) and the references therein. Hone notes that "it is too late for auctions to be held periodically throughout the commitment period for Phase III or the EU ETS (2013-2020) but it could be introduced as part of the expected legislative process to set the parameters for Phase IV (2021 and beyond, probably extending to 2030)." However, most of the literature on which Hones bases his advocacy (1) assumes price collars supported by bu¤erstock policies rather than by auctions with reserve prices and (2) assumes continual compliance rather than delayed compliance. One exception is Grubb. Grubb (2009 , 2012 proposes setting a reserve price ( ‡oor price) on future EU ETS auctions to mitigate downside risks associated with low-carbon investment and to stabilize auction revenues.
…rms surrender permits as soon as they emit ("continual compliance" instead of "delayed compliance").
In fact, however, the emissions trading schemes that emerged after much political debate and compromise do not conform to the assumptions of these theoretical analyses. While the three federal bills and California AB-32 propose a price collar, the Waxman-Markey 2 and
Kerry-Boxer 3 bills do not propose that it be implemented by the government purchasing anything o¤ered at the ‡oor price and selling at the ceiling price anything demanded up to the limit of its bu¤erstock (Salant, 1983; Miranda and Helmberger, 1988) . Instead, the two bills envision implementing the collar by means of reserve prices on bids at government auctions of emissions permits. 4 For example, both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills propose that the government hold quarterly auctions with minimum reserve prices and distinguish two types of auctions to implement the ‡oor and ceiling, respectively. The minimum reserve price is expected to serve as a ‡oor price ($10 per ton of CO 2 equivalent in 2012). 5 In addition, they also propose another type of auction (a "strategic reserve auction" in the Waxman-Markey bill and a "market stability reserve auction" in the Kerry-Boxer bill) to implement a ceiling. A fraction (1-3%) of permits is to be placed each year in a government stockpile (the "strategic reserve account" in the Waxman-Markey bill and the "market stability reserve account" in the Kerry-Boxer bill) and auctioned quarterly with a minimum reserve price that is higher than the ‡oor price ($28 per ton of CO 2 equivalent in 2012). 6 The KerryLieberman bill 7 proposes a price ‡oor implemented by reserve auctions in the same manner as the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills. 8 California AB-32 also proposes quarterly reserve price auctions. Sales from bu¤erstocks at …xed prices are contemplated in only two circumstances. California AB-32 envisions sales of speci…ed numbers of permits at speci…ed prices from an "Allowance Price Containment Reserve" shortly after each quarterly auction. In addition, 2 The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. 3 The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009. 4 Dallas Burtraw has pointed out that in principle there are really four possible policies rather than the two that we analyze, since a price ceiling supported in one way (either by a bu¤erstock transaction or by a reserve price auction) can be paired with a price ‡oor supported in the other way. 5 After 2012, the minimum reserve price increases by 5% plus the rate of in ‡ation each year in both bills. 6 The Waxman-Markey bill provides that the minimum reserve price for a ceiling increases by 5% plus the rate of in ‡ation each year in 2013 and 2014, and that in 2015 and thereafter it be 60 percent above a rolling 36-month average of the daily closing price. On the other hand, the Kerry-Boxer bill provides that the minimum reserve price for a ceiling increases by 5% plus the rate of in ‡ation each year in 2013 through 2017, and then increases by 7% plus the rate of in ‡ation in 2018 and each year thereafter. 7 The American Power Act of 2010. 8 The reserve price starting from $12 in 2013 increases by 3% plus the rate of in ‡ation in 2014 and each year thereafter.
the Kerry-Lieberman bill proposes a price ceiling defended by direct sales of permits from a government reserve, the "cost containment reserve," at a ceiling price ($25 per ton of CO 2 equivalent in 2013) for the 90-day period ending on the date on which covered entities are required to demonstrate compliance. 9 We assume continual compliance throughout this paper and delayed compliance in a companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant, 2012) . By comparing the results in the two papers, one sees that price collars have very di¤erent consequences under these two compliance regimes. By assuming continual compliance in the current paper, we facilitate comparison to the previous literature and in addition may provide guidance in the formulation of future price collar regulations. 10 We show that under continual compliance, even if the auction succeeds in driving the permit price down to the reserve price, that price will subsequently pierce that ceiling. Thus, the analogy between a price band implemented by a bu¤erstock policy and a price collar implemented by auction reserve prices is false. The price paths induced by these two policies are dramatically di¤erent under continual compliance. 11 This di¤erence is particularly striking in the limiting case where the ceiling and ‡oor coincide (a price "peg"). Given a su¢ ciently large inventory, a bu¤erstock price policy could then stabilize the price and would therefore be equivalent to an emissions tax. In contrast, the proposed policy will almost never achieve this result. The paper proceeds as follows.
In Section 2, we analyze the optimal decisions of …rms given an arbitrary path of prices and then characterize the competitive equilibrium. In Section 3, we examine the e¤ect of a price collar implemented by a price band bu¤erstock policy. In Section 4, we consider the alternative policy of implementing the collar with reserve price auctions as speci…ed in the legislation. Section 5 determines whether either way of implementing a price collar approximates an emissions tax as the collar tightens. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Model

Demand for Permits to Be Used Contemporaneously
We consider a world with a competitive market for pollution permits in continuous-time t 2 [0; 1). To facilitate comparison to previous analyses, we require …rms to surrender continually permits to cover their contemporaneous emissions ("continual compliance"). 12 That is, we require …rm i (i 2 f1; 2;
; N g) to relinquish at time t one pollution permit for every unit of emissions at time t. The …rms acquire the permits on the market at the going price p(t) at time t. Each …rm determines the quantity of emissions and the quantity of emissions permits that it sells or purchases at time t. We consider its decisions about emissions and the trade of permits separately.
Denote …rm i's emissions at time t as e i (t) and the abatement cost for …rm i by C i (e i ). We assume that C i (e i ) is a twice-continuously di¤erentiable and strictly convex function with respect to e i such that C 0 i (e i ) < 0 and C 00 i (e i ) > 0 and that C 0 i (0) is …nite. Note that the abatement cost function is assumed to be stationary. We con…ne attention to the case of deterministic cost function since our aim is to make the consequences of the proposed collar transparent.
Because of the stationarity of the abatement cost function, …rm i chooses its emissions at time t to minimize the sum of the abatement cost and the cost of purchasing the requisite permits at the price p(t). Then this problem can be written as
The …rst-order conditions for this problem are
Condition (1) implies that, if …rm i emits a positive level of emissions, we must have
That is, …rm i sets its emissions so that its marginal cost of pollution abatement equals the permit price. Condition (2) implies that, when it chooses to emit nothing, permits are so expensive that their price is at least as high as the marginal cost of even the …rst unit of emissions: p(t) C 0 i (0). Because of the strict convexity of the objective function, these …rst-order conditions are 12 The actual requirement of the three bills is that on a designated date each year, …rms must surrender enough permits to cover their cumulative emissions over the previous year ("delayed compliance"). Hasegawa and Salant (2012) show that under delayed compliance not even a bu¤erstock policy can enforce the collar. necessary and su¢ cient to identify e i (t) for i = 1; 2;
; N . Conditions (1) and (2) uniquely identify the quantity of emissions of …rm i as a function of the permit price p(t) so that
, where e i (t) is the quantity of emissions of …rm i at the price p(t). We can interpret e i (t) = D i (p(t)) as the quantity of permits that …rm i demands at the permit price p(t) in order to emit the pollution level of e i (t) at time t, or the demand for permits to be used instantaneously by …rm i at time t. From equation (1), we have (provided e i (t) > 0)
Thus, the demand function is strictly decreasing in the price of permits as long as …rm i chooses positive emissions. From conditions (2) and (3), there is a "choke price" for …rm i, p
i . The aggregate demand for permits to be surrendered contemporaneously at time t by all …rms is de…ned by
The aggregate demand function is also strictly decreasing in the permit price as long as at least one of N …rms chooses a positive amount of emissions at the price. We can de…ne the choke price for this aggregate demand function as p c = maxfp 
Trade of Permits
We assume that …rms can bank their permits without limitation and use stored permits any time they want. 13 Then they determine not only the quantity of permits used to emit e i (t)
; N at time t but also the quantity of permits that they sell or buy so as to maximize their wealth. Let x i (t) denote …rm i's net sales of permits at the permit price p(t) at time t. x i (t) > 0 implies that …rm i sells x i (t) permits at time t, and x i (t) < 0 implies that it purchases jx i (t)j permits at time t. As we will discuss in detail in the following sections, the government provides …rms with permits by grandfathering and by direct selling at a …xed price or at auctions. We denote the set of instants when the government grandfathers or auctions permits for N …rms as = fT 1 ; T 2 ; :::; T j 1 ; T j ; T j+1 ; :::; T J 1 ; T J g, where 0
T j < T j+1 for j = 1; 2; :::; J 1; and T J < 1, which means that the government will provide permits J times in total by grandfathering or selling at auctions at times T 1 ; :::; T J . We denote y it as the quantity of permits provided for …rm i by the government at time t 2 .
y it can be negative when …rm i sells jy it j permits at a ‡oor price to the government. Then …rm i will face the following problem
subject to
t#T j s i (t) + y iT j for j = 1; 2; :::; J (7)
where s i (t) is the stock of permits in the bank for …rm i. The stock s i (t) discontinuously jumps up at the time when the government provides permits at time t 2 . Equation (5) says that the stock of permits is initially zero. Equation (6) says that the rate of decrease in the stock is equal to the net sales of permits at time t except for the times when permits are provided by the government. 14 Equation (7) implies …rm i's stock of permits at time T j is the sum of the permits that …rm i holds immediately before time T j and y iT j permits provided by the government at time T j . We denote the total net sales of permits by all …rms at time t as x(t): x(t) = P N i=1 x i (t) and the total quantity of the permits provided by the government to all …rms at time t as y t : y t = P N i=1 y it . A competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of a permit price path p(t) and net supply of permits by each …rm fx 1 (t); x 2 (t); ; x N (t)g such that [a] each …rm solves its wealth maximization problem given the equilibrium price path as described by equations (4) to (8); [b] the demand for permits at every instant must be satis…ed by the permits supplied by …rms (x(t) = D(p(t)) for all t 2 [0; 1)); and [c] all of the permits provided to …rms are eventually surrendered by …rms:
The equilibrium conditions imply that the permit price increases at the rate of real interest (Hotelling's rule) when …rms carry over ("bank") their permits to the future. Thus, …rms will be indi¤erent between selling and buying any quantity of permits in the market. Given Hotelling's rule, the equilibrium properties [b] and [c] tell us that the equilibrium price path will be uniquely determined by the total quantity of permits provided by the 14 At time t 2 , s(t) is not di¤erentiable with respect to t. government, regardless of the distribution to each …rm, fy 1t ; y 2t ; ; y N t g t2 . Thus, as long as we focus on the equilibrium price path, we can ignore the distribution of the permits provided by the government among …rms, fy 1t ; y 2t ; ; y N t g t2 , as well as the number of permits sold by each …rm, fx 1 (t); x 2 (t); ; x N (t)g t2[0;1) .
Price Collar Implemented by Direct Purchases and Sales
We derive the equilibrium price path when the government imposes a price collar on the permit price. We examine two types of the government policies. First, we start by examining the case where the government is willing from the outset to purchase permits at a ‡oor price and sell permits from the government stock at a ceiling price (a price band bu¤erstock policy). In Section 4, we will consider the case where the government defends ‡oor and ceiling prices by selling permits at auctions with reserve prices. As we will show, the price paths induced by these two government policies are dramatically di¤erent.
In this section, we examine the price stabilization policy, in which the government o¤ers to purchase permits at a ‡oor price and o¤ers to sell any quantity of permits in its possession at a ceiling price. That is, we assume the price collar is implemented like a price band used to stabilize commodity prices or exchange rates. 15 Suppose that the government issues permits each year. We denote the total number of permits issued in year k as q k , the beginning of year k as t = t k , the end of the year (or the beginning of year k + 1) as t = t k+1 . The government grandfathers g k permits to …rms at time t k and deposits h k permits in its reserve account such that q k = g k + h k . Denote a ‡oor price as p f and a ceiling price as p u where p f < p u < p c . We assume that the ceiling price is lower than the choke price (otherwise the ceiling does not a¤ect the permit price at all). Then the permit prices are never less than the ‡oor (if the government has enough wealth to purchase all permits o¤ered at p f ) and exceeds the ceiling only if the government exhausts its reserve. Assuming that …rms do not have any stock of permits at time t k : s i (t k ) = 0 for i = 1; 2; ; N , we focus on the equilibrium price path between time t k and t k+1 . Unless the total number of permits for year k + 1 (q k+1 ) is too small, all of the permits that are grandfathered and sold by the government in year k will be surrendered during that year. Then the permit price in year k can be determined independently of the stock of permits in previous and future years. Thus, we can consider each year's price path independently and uniquely depending on g k ; h k ; p u ; and p f .
For the simplicity of our analysis, we assume provisionally p f < p u e r(t k t k+1 ) , which means that the width of the price band (p u p f ) is so large that the price does not hit the ceiling in the end of the year if it starts from the ‡oor and increases at the rate of interest. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5. Case D1: If an intermediate number (g k ) of permits is grandfathered at time t k satisfying the following inequality,
then the price will start above the ‡oor at time t k , will rise at the rate of interest, and will be strictly below p u at t = t k+1 . The initial price p t k = p(t k ) is determined implicitly by
Then by assumption (9), p t k > p f and p(t k+1 ) = p t k e r(t k+1 t k ) < p u . As illustrated in Figure I , neither the ‡oor nor ceiling price is triggered.
Case D2: When the number of permits grandfathered is so small that the left inequality in (9) is violated,
The price will start above the ‡oor at time t k and will grow at the rate of interest until the ceiling is hit at some time t 0 before time t k+1 . The two variables, p t k and t 0 , are determined by the following two equations:
Equation (12) implies that …rms surrender all of their grandfathered permits between t k and t 0 . Carrying permits beyond t 0 is suboptimal since there is no capital gain to compensate for the loss of interest. After the price reaches the ceiling, the government will keep selling the permits in its reserve at the ceiling price p u until either t k+1 is reached or the permits in its reserve are attacked at t 00 . In this case the price path depends on the amount of government reserve in year k. Case D2(a): When the government reserve is large enough that
holds, the government can defend the ceiling until the end of the year as shown in Figure II .
holds, …rms will buy up from the government all of the remaining reserve permits at some instant t 00 in anticipation that the government's stock of permits would run out before time t k . Between t 00 and t k+1 …rms will then sell the permits they acquired at prices growing up at the rate of interest starting at p(t 00 ) = p u . The time t 00 is determined by the condition
The left-hand side of equation (15) is the total quantity of permits demanded between t 00 and t k+1 . The right-hand side of equation (15) is the government stock of permits acquired at time t 00 . Then the ceiling price is broken due to the speculative attack by …rms at time t 00 as demonstrated by Salant and Henderson (1978) and Salant (1983) . The price path is shown in Figure III .
Case D3(a): When the quantity of grandfathered permits is large and the right inequality in (9) is violated:
If the government did not intervene in the market, the price would start below the ‡oor price. But since the government remains ready anytime to purchase any number of permits at the ‡oor price, the price cannot fall below p f . But the price cannot remain at the ‡oor over an interval because …rms would not have incentive to hold and sell their permits along the horizontal price path and then the market clearing condition [b] cannot be satis…ed. Thus the market price has to start from p f and increase at the rate of interest. Then the equilibrium conditions [a] - [c] require that in the equilibrium, …rms sell at time t k some stock of permits f k and then the price starts to increase at the rate of interest. f k is determined by
the di¤erence between the total quantity of permits grandfathered to …rms and the number of permits demanded between t k and t k+1 when the price starts to increase from p(t k ) = p f .
The price path is shown in Figure IV . Note that the price path is independent of g k since the total number of permits demanded in the year k does not exceed
is determined under condition (16) regardless of g k as long as the government has enough wealth to buy f k permits and defend the ‡oor.
Case D3(b): When the government's budget to support the ‡oor is limited and it can purchase only f 0 k permits at p f where f 0 k < f k , even under condition (16), the initial price cannot start at p f . Instead the …rms sell f 0 k permits at the ‡oor price (p f ) to the government at time t k but the market price drops below p f to p t k , which is determined by the condition
The price path is shown in Figure IV . Under this policy, the government can defend both the price ‡oor and ceiling as long as it has at all times enough wealth to buy any quantity of permits at p f and has a su¢ ciently large number of permits in its stockpile to sell them whenever the price hits the ceiling. Hence the collar can con…ne the price. If more permits were exogenously grandfathered, the permit price path would fall uniformly. Once the initial price equals the ‡oor (p f ), further increases in the number of permits grandfathered has no further e¤ect on the price path.
Price Collar Implemented by Auctions with Minimum Reserve Prices
In this section, we consider the situation where the government defends a price collar by selling permits at auctions with minimum reserve prices. This is the policy to stabilize the permit prices that was actually speci…ed in the two bills, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer. We assume that p f and p u are the same as in the previous section. We assume that the government grandfathers permits g k to …rms at the beginning of year k (at time t k ) and sells or makes available for sale the rest of permits in auctions. The government holds two types of auctions. First there are "normal auctions" held to distribute up to a k permits at the beginning of year k (at time t k ) and every year thereafter. This auction has a minimum reserve price at p f , the ‡oor of the price collar. We call the other type of auction the "market stability reserve auctions," following the terminology in the Kerry-Boxer bill. The market stability reserve auction is held to distribute up to h k permits at some exogenous time b t 2 (t k ; t k+1 ): It also has a minimum reserve price at p u , the ceiling of the price collar, which we refer to as the "minimum market stability auction price," following the terminology in the Kerry-Boxer bill. Hence the government allocates up to q k permits over the year such that q k = g k + a k + h k . So far, we assume that the normal auction is held once per year (at time t k ) and the market stability reserve auction is held once per year (at time b t). The essence of how these auctions work to defend the price collar can be demonstrated under this simpli…ed setting, though we consider the case called for in the bills where the government holds both types of auctions quarterly in the appendix.
Price Floor Implemented by Auctions
First we look at the e¤ect of the normal auction with the reserve price p f . Under the assumption p f < p u e r(t k t k+1 ) , we assume that any …rm can join this auction to purchase the permits from the government with the minimum reserve price (p f ) at time t k . Denote the price of the permits traded in the normal auction as p a . Then we note that if the permit price in the market in time t k is lower than p f , none of the government's a k permits will be sold in the normal auction because no one would bid as much as p f to buy permits in the auction given p(t k ) < p f . Thus, if some permits are sold at the auction, we must have
In addition, if the market price were ever higher than the price in the auction (p(t k ) > p a ), …rms would buy permits at the auction rather than in the market and they would bid up the auction price until the auction price equals the market price. On the other hand, if the market price were ever lower than the auction price (p(t k ) < p a ), no one would buy permits at the auction. Therefore, the permits prepared for the normal auction by the quantity of a k must be traded at some price e p t k , which is the same price as that in the market: e p t k = p a .
Note that since under the assumption p f < p u e r(t k t k+1 ) , the permit price will not be above p u at time b t and no permits are sold at the market stability reserve auction. Thus we can ignore it when we examine the e¤ect of the normal auction on the permit price path. Now we uniquely determine the equilibrium price path depending on g k ; a k ; and p f .
Case F 1: When a large number of permits is grandfathered so that
holds, the price starts below the reserve price p f and no government permits are sold in the normal auction at t k . Then the initial price p t k can be determined by the following condition:
where p t k < p f and the price simply increases at the rate of interest as shown in Figure V .
The minimum reserve price in this auction cannot a¤ect the price path at all regardless of the number of permits the government is prepared to auction (a k ).
Case F 2: When a small number of permits is grandfathered so that
holds, in the absence of the normal auction at time t k , the price would start above or at the same price equal to p f , the initial price p t k would be determined by
where p t k p f , and then some or all of a k permits would be sold at the auction. The initial price (or the auctioned price) depends (as speci…ed below) on the number of permits the government prepares for the auction (a k ). Case F 2(a): When the government auctions a small number of permits such that
holds, then …rms will buy all of the auctioned permits at time t k at the price e p t k , which is determined by
The initial price e p t k is lower than that in absence of the auction (p t k ), but it is still higher than p f as shown in Figure VI .
Case F 2(b): When the government prepares for its normal auctions at time t k so many permits that
holds, the government will sell at time t k
permits, which is strictly less than the total number of auctioned permits a k . The market price is initially p f and grows at the rate of interest as shown in Figure VI .
Price Ceiling Implemented by Auctions
Next, we look at the e¤ect of the market stability reserve auction with the minimum reserve price p u .This auction will be held at exogenous time b t 2 (t k ; t k+1 ) to defend the ceiling price p u . The government sells up to h k permits from its reserve through the auction. We assume that any …rm can join this auction to purchase the permits from the government at the minimum reserve price p u at time b t. Then, as in the case of the normal auction, if the market price at the time of this auction is lower than the minimum reserve price: p( b t) < p u , the government sells no permits in the auction. We again denote the initial price in the market without the auction by p t k , which is determined by condition (19). Note that as the quantity of the grandfathered permits (g k ) is larger, p t k becomes lower. To focus on the e¤ect of the market stability reserve auction, we do not consider the normal auction here (a k = 0):
Case C1: When g k is su¢ ciently large so that
holds, no bids are accepted by the government at time b t since p( b t) = p t k e r( b t t k ) < p u . Thus the price just increases at the rate of interest starting from p t k as shown in Figure VII .
Case C2: When g k is not large so that
holds, the permits are sold at the auction since the price at time b t would be above the minimum reserve price p u in the absence of the market stability reserve auction. Then we consider the following cases (see below). Case C2(a): When the government reserve h k is so small that
holds, all of h k permits will be sold at time b t. The initial price must be determined so that all of the permits (g k + h k ) are demanded and supplied between t k and t k+1 . As in the previous section, we denote the initial price when the permits are sold at the market stability auction by e p t k . When g k is not small enough so that
holds, the initial price e p t k is determined by the following condition:
Then the price at time b t is higher than p u and the new price path goes down compared to that in the absence of the auction as shown in Figure VIII .
Case C2(b): Under condition (24), when the government reserve h k is large enough so that
holds, the initial price e p t k is determined by the condition
Equation (27) implies that the initial price is determined so that the price path passes p u exactly at time b t when it starts to increases from e p t k at time t k at the rate of interest. Under condition (26), the government will sell in the market reserve stability auction
permits from the government reserve (h k ), and the price reaches the ceiling at p u at time b t as shown in Figure VIII .
Case C3: When g k is small enough so that
holds, the initial price cannot start from e p t k since, if so, g k permits would be exhausted before time b t. Then the initial price would need to be recalculated so that all of the initial stock of g k permits is sold up in the market between t k and b t. We denote it as p 0 t k , which is determined as follows:
Case C3(a): When the government reserve is so small that
holds, the initial price p 0 t k is determined by the following condition:
so that all of the grandfathered permits are exhausted at time b t. Then the price will drop to p b t , which is determined by
as shown in Figure IX as long as p b t < e p t k e r( b t t k ) holds.
16 16 If it is violated because h k is too small, the price will not drop to p b t at time b t. The initial price will Case C3(b): Given that condition (29) holds, when the government reserve is su¢ ciently large so that
holds, the initial price is the same as in Case C3(a) but the government will sell in the market stability reserve auction
permits from the government reserve (h k ) and the permit price will drop to p u at time b t as shown in Figure IX .
The Combination of Two Types of Auctions
So far we have examined the normal auctions and the market stability reserve auctions separately. Now we can identify the price paths when the government holds the normal auction at time t k and then the market stability reserve auction at time b t in year k. In Subsection 4.1, we demonstrated that the normal auction works when the government grandfathers a small number of permits at time t k (condition (20)) and just lowers the permit prices uniformly as in Case F 2. We can consider the price paths based on Cases F 1; F 2; and C1 C3. If condition (18) holds as in Case F 1, the price will start below p f and p( b t) < p u since condition (22) in Case C1 is automatically satis…ed under the assumption p f < p u e r(t k t k+1 ) .
Then no permits are sold at either the normal auction or the market stability reserve auction. Thus the price path is the same as that in Case F 1.
If condition (22) holds but condition (18) is violated such that
the permits are sold only at the normal auction. Thus the price path is the same as that in Case F 2.
be determined by equation (24), and the price will increase at the rate of interest throughout the year as in Case C2.
If g k is small and thus condition (22) fails to hold:
hold, where e p t k is determined by condition (33) if b t) )dt holds, a k permits will be sold in the normal auction at time t k . Then all of the initial stock of (a k + g k ) permits are exhausted between t k and b t. The initial price p 0 t k is determined by the condition
and the permit price will drop at time b t to p b t , which is determined by condition (30) as in Case C3(a).
hold, the initial price is the same as in Case C3(a 0 ), but the government will sell
permits in the market stability reserve auction and the price will drop to p u at time b t as in
In any of these cases above, the price path is the essentially the same as that which we derived in Subsection 4.2 except that the prices are uniformly lowered because a k permits are additionally sold in the normal auction at time t k .
In this auction setting, the auctioned permits a k and h k contribute to lowering the price path only when those permits are sold in these auctions. But unlike the price band policy implemented by the government direct purchases and sales of permits, if the market price for permits is below the minimum reserve prices, then nothing is sold at either auction regardless of the number of permits prepared for the auctions (a k and h k ). This is illustrated in Cases F 1 and C1. It can happen when the government grandfathers a large number of permits at time t k .
In addition, even though a su¢ ciently large number of permits are prepared for these auctions as in Cases F 2(b), C2(b); and C3(b), after these auctions, the price continues to increase at the rate of interest. Especially, in Cases C2(b) and C3(b), after time b t, the permit price breaks the ceiling and keeps growing by the rate of interest. The ceiling of the collar is not con…ning in these cases.
Although we assumed that the normal auction is held at time t k and the market stability reserve auction at b t once in year k, these results are robust: they do not change even if the government holds normal and market stability reserve auctions more than once in each year. We consider the case where the market stability reserve auctions are held quarterly in each year in the appendix.
Price Collar versus Emissions Tax When the Price Band Is Narrow
It is widely believed that price collars implemented by auctions with reserve prices will successfully stabilize the permit price and keep it between the ‡oor and ceiling prices. This belief presumably rests on the analogy between a price collar implemented by auctions and a price band implemented by purchases and sales from a bu¤erstock. However, as we demonstrated in Sections 3 and 4, this is a false analogy: the price paths induced by those two policies are dramatically di¤erent.
It also seems to be widely believed that, as the collar tightens, this policy will approach an emissions tax policy. But this contention is incorrect. Consider the situation where the bandwidth of the collar is very narrow so that p u = p f + ", where " is a positive but
Under the bu¤erstock policy that we studied in the previous section, as long as the government has su¢ cient reserve permits (h k ) to sell at the ceiling price (condition (14) holds) and has enough budget to purchase any permits at the ‡oor price at time t k , the price path will be similar to that under the emissions tax rate at t = p u ( p f ). Because the bandwidth is very narrow ("), …rms will sell almost all of their permits (f k in (17)) at time t k , the price will hit the ceiling immediately after t k , and then the government will sell the reserve permits at p u until time t k+1 . The price path is shown in Figure X .
Conclusion
It is widely believed that price collars will successfully stabilize the price of emissions permits and will keep it between the ‡oor and ceiling prices. This belief rests on the presumed analogy between price collars implemented by auctions and price bands implemented by bu¤erstocks. However, the analogy is false. As we showed in Sections 3 and 4, the price paths induced under these two policies are dramatically di¤erent. The price collars proposed in the federal bills and in programs implemented elsewhere utilize government auctions with minimum reserve prices. Under such a policy, the normal auctions and market stability reserve auctions contribute to lowering the price path only when the auctioned permits are sold in these auctions. But unlike the price band policy implemented with government bu¤erstocks, if the permit price is below the minimum reserve prices at the time of an auction, no permits are sold. Then, even if the auction drives the permit price down to the reserve price, the permit price will subsequently pierce the ceiling.
These results indicate that the price collar policy does not necessarily approach an emissions tax policy as the collar tightens. We have shown that the price path will not be similar to that under the emissions tax policy even if the government narrows or eliminates the width of the price collar. This result is important because many believe that imposing a tight price collar on a cap-and-trade program will yield results virtually identical to an emissions tax policy. 17 Most analyses of price collars conclude that they are more e¤ective at restricting the price. They reach this conclusion because they assume that, contrary to the actual regulations, price collars will be implemented through government bu¤erstock policies rather than through reserve-price auctions. The government is assumed to purchase emissions permits at a ‡oor price and to sell any quantity of permits in its possession at a ceiling price. As we have shown, the government can then defend both the price ‡oor and ceiling as long as it has enough wealth to buy whatever permits are supplied at the ‡oor price and enough permits to sell whatever is demanded at the ceiling price. Hence a collar implemented in this way would con…ne the price if …rms were required to surrender enough permits to cover their contemporaneous emissions ("continual compliance"). However, every program of emissions trading, whether implemented or merely proposed, requires only delayed compliance: on a designated day …rms must surrender enough permits to cover their cumulative emissions since the previous compliance date ("delayed compliance"). In our companion paper (Hasegawa and Salant, 2012) , we show that this relaxation of the compliance requirement renders even bu¤erstock implementation of the price collar ine¤ective.
holds, the initial price is determined so that e p t k e r(t Q4 t k ) = p u ;
which means that the price path passes p u exactly at time t Q4 when it starts to increase from e p t k at time t k at the rate of interest (as long as g k R t Q4 t k D(e p t k e r(t t k ) )dt holds). Under condition (41), the government will sell
t k D(p u e r(t t Q4 ) )dt g k permits in the last market reserve stability auction at time t Q4 . This is similar to Case
C2(b).
The price path is shown in Figure XIV .
